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Abstract
Perspectival realism aims to reconcile the practice and the history of science with
the realist commitment to mind-independent things such as natural kinds (Massimi
2018a;b, Teller 2011, Giere 2006). Yet an unambiguous realist commitment, par-
ticularly to natural kinds, is still missing from most perspectival realists’ accounts
(Cret¸u forthcoming,b, Morrison 2011, Chakravartty 2010). The problem of inte-
grating the two commitments is identified as ‘the commitment problem’. Taking
inspiration from another weak realist position, structural realism (Ladyman and
Ross 2007), a new account – natural kinds as real patterns – is developed as a solu-
tion to the commitment problem for perspectival realism. The natural kinds as real
patterns account combines four main ingredients. First, a notion of ‘perspective-
independence’, an empirically driven notion, different from mind-independence and
objectivity. Second, a notion of ‘real patterns’, used to denote stable empirical reg-
ularities which science is in the business of tracking (Ladyman and Ross 2007,
Dennett 1991). Third, a crucial distinction between ‘research traditions’ and ‘per-
spectives’ which is introduced to secure the legitimacy of perspective-independent
real patterns (Laudan 1977). Fourth, a dual commitment to both real patterns (qua
relations) and objects (qua relata).
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1 Introduction
What would a perspectival realist account of natural kinds look like? Perspectival real-
ism is committed to the existence of mind-independent things and to the historical and
cultural situatedness of scientific knowledge (Massimi 2018a;b, Teller 2011, Giere 2006).
The first is the realist commitment and the latter is the perspectivalist commitment.
A perspectival realist account of natural kinds would, accordingly, have to successfully
integrate both of these commitments. However, as a weak realist position, perspectival
realism is susceptible to a common worry raised against other weak realist positions such
as structural realism. The worry is that within such weak realist positions there is no
scope for a substantial ontological commitment to anything (see Ladyman 2016, Psil-
los 2001). Whilst many arguments have been articulated in support of the perspectivalist
commitment, the realist commitment remains largely unsupported (Cret¸u forthcoming,b).
Thus, integrating the two commitments within a perspectival realist account of natural
kinds brings forth a particularly fraught problem for perspectival realism, let us call it
the commitment problem.
Strong realist views, such as ‘essentialism’ (Ellis 2001) or ‘homeostatic property
cluster kinds’ (Boyd 1991), incorporate a realist commitment, but are not sufficiently
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perspectival (Giere 2006) for two main reasons. First, such views are not sufficiently
practice-relative. To be precise, such views either deny the role which theoretical interests
and assumptions play in scientific classifications or they only apply to some sciences but
not to others (Slater 2017; 2015, Khalidi 2016b, Ereshefsky and Reydon 2015, Kendig 2015,
Magnus 2014; 2012, Massimi 2014, Craver 2009 etc.). For example, essentialism doesn’t
work very well for biology (Ellis 2001, Okasha 2002) and the homeostatic property cluster
kinds does not apply to physics (Khalidi 2016b). Second, strong realist views are not
ontologically scale-relative (Bursten 2016, Ladyman and Ross 2007). That is, they tend
to ignore that what may exist on a particular spatiotemporal or energetic scale may not
exist on a different scale. Thus, solving the commitment problem for perspectival realism
calls for a new strategy.
The new strategy, call it ‘the real patterns strategy’, is an elaboration of certain
key insights of structural realism. In particular, the real patterns strategy presupposes
the improvement and development of Ladyman and Ross’ suggestion that a weak realist
position can be practice- and scale-relative whilst also being ontologically committed to
‘real patterns’. Ladyman and Ross’ real patterns strategy will be ultimately found to be
unsatisfactory to resolve the commitment problem for perspectival realism. However, cer-
tain key insights will be retained and developed into a new account – natural kinds as real
patterns – which can successfully integrate the realist and perspectivalist commitments.
In the new account, natural kinds are real patterns, where real patterns are robust relations
amongst entities exhibited by any two given entities with sufficient regularity on any given
scale.
The natural kinds as real patterns account is built upon four core conceptual ingre-
dients: first, a notion of ‘perspective-independence’ which is an empirically driven notion,
different from the ‘God’s eye view’ metaphysical notion of mind-independence and from
the methodological notion of objectivity. Second, a notion of ‘real patterns’, which is
used to denote stable empirical regularities which science is in the business of tracking
(Dennett 1991, Ladyman and Ross 2007). Third, the crucial distinction between ‘research
traditions’ and ‘perspectives’. Following Laudan (1977), a research tradition is understood
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as “a set of assumptions: assumptions about the basic kinds of entities in the world, as-
sumptions about how those entities interact, assumptions about the proper methods to
use for constructing and testing theories about those entities” (p. 97). In contrast, the
notion of ‘perspective’ is used to mean a sophisticated theoretical framework that en-
compasses the set of theoretical interests and background theoretical knowledge that a
researcher or group of researchers can be said to hold at any given time.1
It will be argued that real patterns are ‘authenticated’ prior to the development of
perspectives on their nature. Authentication refers to the identification and validation of
a particular empirical phenomena as well established and genuine. Thus a research tra-
dition affords the authentication of empirically genuine real patterns, whilst perspectives
are subsequently developed to study their nature. It is worth noting that perspectives
may not lead to understanding the nature of the authenticated real patterns and thus
fail. Yet, when they do fail, the authenticated real patterns remain authenticated. Hence,
the ontological commitments warranted by the research tradition can be retained even
when perspectives are abandoned. To the extent to which the distinction between re-
search traditions and perspectives is accepted, it will be argued that real patterns are
perspective-independent empirical phenomena. As authenticated phenomena, indepen-
dent of perspectives, the commitment to real patterns thus constitutes a legitimate onto-
logical commitment. Therefore, with authentication in hand, a more convincing general
strategy for resolving the commitment problem for perspectival realism can be developed.
In the true spirit of perspectival realism, a further novel development of the real
patterns strategy consists in drawing important lessons from the history and philoso-
phy of science. In particular, insights from Whewell’s philosophy of classificatory sciences
(Whewell 1840a;b) are used to remedy further problems with Ladyman and Ross’s (2007)
account. For Ladyman and Ross, a natural kind is a real pattern of ‘high indexical re-
dundancy’, where indexical redundancy concerns the measurability of patterns. A pattern
that can only be measured at one point in time and space by one individual has very low
indexical redundancy. In contrast, a pattern that can be measured from multiple per-
1This is similar to Laudan’s ‘theory’. On a different notion of ‘perspective’, closer to Laudan’s research
tradition, see Massimi (2018a).
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spectives has high indexical redundancy. According to Ladyman and Ross,“[t]here are no
things” (p. 130) and “[s]tructure is all there is” (id.), and hence only real patterns are
ontologically subsistent. However, if we follow Whewell, we must surely accept that any
scientific classification is inherently tied to the ideas of likeness and difference. Yet, these
ideas can only be applied once several objects are compared to one another and their
relations of likeness and difference are identified between them. The process of identifying
relations of likeness and difference lies at the heart of distinguishing between kinds of
objects, which in turn lies at the heart of any account of natural kinds.
It is worth noting, however, that these ideas are not, in and of themselves, inherently
tied to projectibility,2 nor do they need to be, since projectibility does not constitute the
sole aim of all scientific classifications. As Okasha (2002) points out, assuming that the
primary purpose of any scientific classification is that of ‘facilitating causal generalisa-
tions’, “is not necessarily appropriate to all sciences” (p. 210). In particular, an account
which assumes that the point of classification is identifying projectible kinds will have
little applicability to evolutionary biology, where the point of classification is to identify
the units that play a fundamental role in the evolutionary process.
Ideas such as likeness and difference are simply used to identify relations between
objects. The nature of the relevant relations, once authenticated, is subject to discipline
specific investigations into their nature. Distinguishing kinds of objects presupposes the
identification of both objects and relations among them. Thus, the real patterns solution
to the commitment problem for perspectival realism involves both real patterns (qua
relations) and objects (qua relata). Since natural kinds are inherently tied to the ideas of
likeness and difference which require for their application the existence of objects, contra
Ladyman and Ross, at least some things must stay.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 establishes a principled distinction
between perspective-independence, mind-independence, and objectivity, thus clarifying
what kind of ontological commitment is available to the perspectival realist. Section 3
2Projectibility refers to projectibility judgments which can be understood as hypotheses from actual
evidence about certain phenomena to future inductive inferences about same kinds of phenomena. In
making projectible judgments, one makes use of predicates that are entrenched where the entrenchment
of a predicate, following Goodman, “depends upon frequency of projections” Goodman (1983), p. 97.
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critically evaluates Ladyman and Ross’ real patterns strategy. Their strategy is found
unsatisfactory and an improvement is proposed based on Laudan’s framework. In Section
4 the improved strategy is developed into a new account of natural kinds – natural kinds
as real patterns – that resolves the commitment problem for perspectival realism and that
qualifies as a perspectival realist account of natural kinds. Section 5 considers objections
and replies.
2 Perspective-Independence vs. Mind-Independence
Perspectival realism can be characterised positively by its commitment to epistemic plu-
ralism – the idea that there are multiple ways of acquiring knowledge about the world and
multiple different descriptions of mind-independent entities. This commitment extends to
both the history of science and to current scientific practices. Negatively, perspectival real-
ism can be characterised by its rejection of the realists’ epistemic commitment to ultimate,
objectively true pictures of the world. Perspectival realists are nevertheless committed to
mind-independent entities, which in the case of natural kinds are traditionally taken to be
‘objective, mind-independent’ entities (Khalidi 2016a). Thus, the first step in understand-
ing the kind of ontological commitment available to the perspectival realist is to establish
a principled distinction between mind-independence and objectivity.
It is standardly assumed that a natural classification must be mind-independent and
objective. However, objectivity is often conflated with mind-independence. It is not sur-
prising that the two notions are conflated, since objectivity is necessary, but not sufficient
for mind-independence, yet, at the same time, mind-independence is not necessary for
objectivity. To get a clear grasp on objectivity and mind-independence, a few distinctions
are in order.3
A classification can be said to be objective when it is unambiguous and intersubjec-
3See also Khalidi (2016a)’s paper for a four-tier distinction between types of mind-dependence, as well
as Franklin-Hall (2015)’s paper, who distinguishes between ‘fully objective’ and ‘fully mind-independent
kinds’.
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tively well-founded.4 Objectivity is a methodological notion, pertaining to the practice of
science and not to the nature of the world. As Daston and Galison (2007) note “[t]o be ob-
jective is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower – knowledge unmarked
by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgement, wishing or striving. Objectivity is blind sight,
seeing without inference, interpretation, or intelligence” (p. 17). A classification can be
objective without being mind-independent, for example the classification of flags. Flags,
and what they represent in different circumstances, are human constructs whose ongoing
existence and function is dependent upon humans maintaining such constructs and their
ongoing performance (Thomasson 2014). Although objectivity is an important notion for
the philosophical analysis of science, since it is a methodological rather than ontological
notion, it is not directly relevant to the commitment problem.
A classification is standardly assumed to be mind-independent when it is indepen-
dent of human thought.5 Yet, complete independence from human thought resembles a
form of God’s eye view, impossible to attain. Mind-independence, in the strong realist’s
sense, is not only unattainable, it is incompatible with scientific practice. No inquiry can
proceed without at least some theoretical assumptions about the nature of the world (see
Haslanger 2015, Kendig 2015). For example, the most common assumptions in connection
to natural kinds are that the world is structured, that it is stable enough, that there are hi-
erarchies of objects etc.6 General methodological assumptions such as these are inevitable
components of any research tradition. Thus, there can be no natural kinds classifications
that are mind-independent in the strong realist’s sense.
Within a research tradition, however, ‘perspective-independence’ can be obtained.7
A perspective is an evolving theoretical outlook that offers a particularised ontology. In the
context of real patterns, a perspective is an interpretation of the nature of authenticated
real patterns. The real patterns themselves are authenticated prior to the development
4Giere (2006) similarly defines objectivity as “reliable intersubjective agreement”, p. 34.
5This notion of mind-independence has already been criticised by perspectival realists, see Giere 2006,
Massimi 2018a;b.
6A similar point about assumptions is extensively made by Kant (1781), see especially the Appendix
pp. 590 - 604 , and also by Whewell (1840a), see especially pp. 18 - 41.
7Massimi (2018b) also talks about perspective-independent things, though endorsing “the realist meta-
physical tenet about a mind-independent (and perspective-independent) world” (p.170). See also fn. 1
above.
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of perspectives. Things that are perspective-independent will still be mind-independent
in virtue of their dependence on the research tradition. For example, within the research
tradition of relativistic quantum mechanics, positrons were authenticated independently
of perspectives on their nature (Cret¸u forthcoming,a). As authenticated real patterns,
positrons were studied further by a hole-theoretic perspective and a field-theoretic perspec-
tive (Roque´ 1997). The hole-theoretic perspective was later abandoned, but positrons re-
mained authenticated (Cret¸u forthcoming,a, Pashby 2012). Thus, positrons are perspective-
independent real patterns. Like positrons, real patterns that are authenticated within a
scientific research tradition, are empirically-driven, perspective-independent phenomena.
Perspective-independent real patterns thus constitute a legitimate realist commitment,
worthy of any respectable realist account.
The question of realism and mind-(in)dependence has recently been taken up by
Ereshefsky (2018) and Khalidi (2016a). Khalidi (2016a) argues that “mind-independence
... is irrelevant to realism about [a] phenomenon” (p. 225), because if it is used as a
criterion for the reality of kinds, a lot of kinds in the domain of natural sciences would be
excluded. He proposes instead to “discern real or natural kinds” (p. 242) by using a “causal
criterion of reality” according to which a kind exists if “it has instances that share causal
properties” (p. 243). Ereshefsky (2018) thinks Khalidi places “too much emphasis on
causality” (p. 854) thus excluding a variety of astrophysical, microbiological, and physical
kinds that are not defined causally. Insofar as Khalidi rejects the strong realists’ notion
of mind-independence as irrelevant to realism about kinds, his account is a promising
avenue for solving the commitment problem for perspectival realism. But, if Ereshefsky is
right, Khalidi’s account will be insufficiently practice-relative since many areas of natural
science (in particular modern physics) appear to operate without reference to causes.
As regards Ereshefsky’s (2018) account, he thinks we should focus on the ‘defeasi-
bility’ of kinds, a provision according to which “the relations asserted by a classification
should not be true by definition and could be defeated by empirical evidence” (p. 850).
Any account that claims to be practice-relative should incorporate Ereshefsky’ naturalistic
suggestion, already implicit in Whewell (1840a)’s considerations on classificatory sciences.
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Beyond defeasibility, it is not however clear to what extent Ereshefsky commits to the
realist commitment of perspectival realism, and thus his account does not constitute a
viable solution to the commitment problem.8
Finally, a classification that is empirically driven by observations of perspective-
independent entities can be said to be a natural classification. Making sure that the study
of nature is done by systematic and objective means whilst being heeded by empirical
phenomena is all we can expect from perspective-independence, and hence from a natural
classification or system.
3 The Real Patterns Strategy
Originally proposed by Dennett (1991), in a now classic article ‘Real Patterns’, the real
patterns strategy has been developed in most detail thus far by Ladyman and Ross (2007)
in their iconoclastic ‘Every Thing Must Go’.9 In this section it will be shown that Lady-
man and Ross’ strategy is, despite several merits, unsuccessful in providing a clear-cut
ontological commitment to perspective-independent real patterns. Partly because of this
and partly for other reasons which will be discussed in the next section, Ladyman and
Ross’ strategy cannot in its current form be used to solve the commitment problem for
perspectival realism.
Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that science is in the business of tracking stable
empirical regularities: ‘real patterns’. Their starting point is the assumption that with-
out stable regularities there can be no predictions. Without predictions, there can be no
science. Hence, one needs to take real patterns seriously. Proceeding from observations
regarding the objects of study of both physics and the special sciences, Ladyman and
Ross argue that folk-metaphysics misleads in characterising the objects of science as self-
8See Kendig and Grey’s (2019) and Lemeire’s (2018) recent papers which express general scepticism
regarding the ability of purely epistemic accounts to secure the naturalness of kinds independently of
metaphysical considerations.
9Ross (1995) and Wallace (2010) also applied the real patterns strategy to ontological problems, but
only Ladyman and Ross (2007) have developed it in connection to natural kinds. It is for this reason
that their view takes centre stage here. Ha¨ggqvist (2005) also gestures at the possibility of developing a
natural kinds account based on Dennett’s ‘real patterns’.
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subsistent individuals.10 In physics, in particular, in light of developments in quantum
mechanics and general relativity, parochial metaphysical concepts such as intrinsic na-
tures, identity, persistence, causation, and cohesion break down. In their survey of physics
and the special sciences, Ladyman and Ross, also note, crucially, that we are now in a
position to study events on previously unimaginable spatiotemporal and energetic scales.
Physics, for example, studies phenomena that last from anywhere around a tiny fraction
of a second to years and decades and can also focus on spatial scales infinitely smaller
than the “spatial scales of a millimetre to a few thousand miles” which “are all that have
concerned us until recently” (p. 11); astrophysics studies phenomena that similarly can
last from a fraction of a second to millions of years; whilst geology “require[s] us to adopt
time scales that make all of human history seem like a vanishingly brief event” (p. 11).
What these examples point to is the scale-relativity of ontology, where,
[s]cale relativity of ontology is the more daring hypothesis that claims about
what (really, mind-independently) exists should be relativized to (real, mind-
independent) scales at which nature is measurable (p. 200).
For Ladyman and Ross, “from the metaphysical point of view, what exists, are just
real patterns” (p. 121), where a pattern is real if and only if it is projectible under “at
least one physically possible perspective” and encodes information about other patterns.
To be precise, Ladyman and Ross define real patterns as follows:
To be is to be a real pattern; and a pattern x → y is real iff
(i) it is projectible; and
(ii) it has a model that carries information about at least one pattern P in an
encoding that has logical depth less than the bit-map encoding of P, and where
P is not projectible by a physically possible device computing information
about another real pattern of lower logical depth than x → y” (p. 233).
Nature can be studied by identifying and measuring real patterns. Real patterns
are measured by indicating their locators. A locator is an “index relative to an address
10By self-subsistent individuals Ladyman and Ross (2007) can be interpreted to mean objects with
transcendental individuality. See points (1) to (3) on p. 134.
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system” where “operations of fixing, stabilizing, and maintaining salience of some data
from one measurement operation to another” (p. 121) have been performed. Locators pre-
suppose some background theory; so “[h]ow precisely a given locator, in the context of a
given theoretical structure, tells us to focus our measurements varies with the refinement
of empirical theory” (p. 122). Thus, that one can take multiple measurements at multiple
locators and those measurements can be repeated by different observers is what makes
the real patterns strategy comply with objectivity demands. It is worth noting that real
patterns can have high or low indexicality, which depends not on the level of refinement
of theory, but on the relative distribution and measurability of patterns across the uni-
verse. Electrons, for example, can be measured at nearly any locator in the universe and
thus have high-indexicality. Biological patterns such as giant pandas are measurable only
from certain small regions of the universe, and thus have lower indexicality than physical
patterns. But, biological patterns can still be said to have high-indexicality compared
with tables and chairs since measurements of biological patterns can be taken on more
scales and at more locators than tables and chairs inhabit. Though tables and chairs have
low-indexicality, they are still real patterns on the view espoused by Ladyman and Ross.
Real patterns thus defined, are at the core of the authors ‘ontic structural realism’.11
In a nutshell, ontic structural realism denies the existence of metaphysically fundamental
individuals whilst embracing relational structure as ontologically fundamental. In doing
this, ontic structural realism dispenses with traditional objects in favour of real patterns.
As a consequence, much about the orthodoxy of science is reevaluated and ends up being
constrained by physics. Given physics’s maximum level of generality and therefore its
primacy over other sciences,12 concepts such as cohesion and causation lose some of their
metaphysical shine even in the special sciences. But cohesion and causation are still very
useful principles for understanding the phenomena of the special sciences, though not
necessarily for understanding their ontology.
What Ladyman and Ross take themselves to provide is a way of making the ontology
11For a general overview of structural realism see Ladyman (2016). For a recent critical overview of
ontic structural realism see McKenzie (2017).
12See Ladyman and Ross (2007), p. 44 for a precise formulation of the Primacy of Physics principle.
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of science compatible and continuous with recent developments in a variety of scientific
practices. In this respect, their view can be said to fulfil the practice-relativity requirement.
Their view also promises a commitment to perspective-independent real patterns, which
can be said to underpin projectible generalisations and explanations in science generally.
However, by making real patterns dependent on a “physically possible perspective”, where
such a perspective is constrained by what “physics tells us could be physically occupied”
(p. 236), they invite a reading of perspective that is at the same time too restrictive and
too liberal. It is too restrictive because it unduly restricts possibilities to what may be
compatible with the “best physics”. Yet, the best physics may both exclude possibilities
that may turn out to track real patterns13, or may fail to contemplate unconceived al-
ternatives (see Stanford 2006). It is too liberal because it blurs the distinction between
paradigmatic human constructs such as tables and chairs, and perspective-independent
scientific objects such as positrons and other empirically authenticated kinds.
As it stands Ladyman and Ross’ real patterns account does not provide a clear cut
commitment to perspective-independent real patterns. Thus, both of the above criticisms
underwrite a more serious challenge, namely that Ladyman and Ross’ ontological commit-
ment to perspective-independent real patterns is insubstantial. In sum, whilst Ladyman
and Ross’ view delivers practice-relativity and scientific objectivity, it does not deliver an
ontological commitment to perspective-independent entities, and thus in its current form
cannot constitute a solution to the commitment problem for perspectival realism. If the
real patterns strategy can indeed be used to tackle ontological problems, in particular
the commitment problem for perspectival realism, real patterns need to be shown to be
perspective-independent.
The distinction between research traditions and perspectives helps us understand
that there are different stages of theory development which play different roles in inves-
tigating natural phenomena. In the first instance, one has to ensure that the relevant
phenomena are genuine (Laudan 1977, p. 18). To be precise, phenomena, which include
13The existence of antimatter was initially regarded as an impossibility by the “best physics” at the
time, even after Dirac’s prediction of it. For details see Cret¸u forthcoming,a, Pashby 2012, Roque´ 1997,
Darrigol 1988, Hanson 1961; 1962.
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real patterns, must first be authenticated within a research tradition. A research tradition,
is understood as “a set of assumptions: assumptions about the basic kinds of entities in
the world, assumptions about how those entities interact, assumptions about the proper
methods to use for constructing and testing theories about those entities” (p. 97). Au-
thentication is necessary in order to eliminate, insofar as it is possible, potential errors due
to experimentation, measurements, or “freak results” (p. 18). Though the process of au-
thentication can take considerable time it ultimately establishes real patterns as genuine
and worthy of being studied further. Real patterns are studied further within perspectives
sponsored by the research tradition.
A perspective was defined as a sophisticated theoretical framework that encompasses
the set of theoretical interests and background theoretical knowledge that a researcher
or group of researchers can be said to hold at any given time. Real patterns are not
authenticated as having a certain nature – that is, as being of a certain kind, having a
certain origin, or being constituted in a particular way. Real patterns are authenticated
as being genuine phenomena prior to the development of particular perspectives. For this
reason, real patterns are perspective-independent. For example, positrons can be identified
as genuine phenomena in cloud chamber photographs in the absence of perspectives on
their nature, that is independently of hole-theoretic or field-theoretic perspectives on
their nature (Roque´ 1997). However, positrons cannot be identified as new phenomena
independently of any assumptions about particles or cloud chambers, and thus they are
not mind-independent in the strong realist’s sense. Yet, insofar as they are authenticated,
positrons can be said to be perspective-independent.
The real patterns strategy, let us recall, was introduced to deliver an ontological
commitment to something in the world. Any ontological commitment worthy of the name
ought to be to something independent of us, of our knowledge, and of our ways of think-
ing about the world. It was shown that complete independence from human thought is
both unattainable and undesirable. It was, however, shown that authentication secures
an ontological commitment to genuine empirical phenomena, albeit of the perspective-
independent type. Perspective-independence is, nevertheless, a virtue of the proposed
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framework for two reasons. First, because perspectives, and not research traditions, par-
ticularise the ontology of nature. Second, because perspectives can only “particularise the
ontology of the research tradition” (p. 81) after the authentication of genuine phenomena.
Perspectives interpret the nature of authenticated empirical phenomena.
To sum up, the real patterns strategy has been examined as a potential means of
solving the commitment problem for natural kinds. A critical assessment of Ladyman and
Ross’ implementation of the real patterns strategy pointed to the lack of a substantial on-
tological commitment. It has been shown that this weakness derives primarily from a dan-
gerous dependence of real patterns upon perspectives. The distinction between research
traditions and perspectives shows how we can understand real patterns as perspective-
independent entities. On the present account, real patterns are authenticated within a
research tradition and this is what makes them real. Real patterns are further studied
from within a perspective, which preserves the ontological commitments of the research
tradition. Perspectives allow one to understand the nature of real patterns. However, when
a perspective is abandoned, one need not also abandon the ontological commitments war-
ranted by the research tradition. Having shown how the real patterns strategy can be
improved in general terms, the commitment problem for perspectival relism is resolved in
the next section by a novel approach.
4 Natural Kinds as Real Patterns
The original proposal for natural kinds as real patterns is due to Ladyman and Ross. It will
be argued that whilst Ladyman and Ross are right to suggest that natural kinds are real
patterns, their view cannot in fact support this claim. Since natural kinds are inherently
tied to the ideas of likeness and difference which require for their application the existence
of objects, contra Ladyman and Ross, at least some things must stay. In particular, it will
be argued that their view must be modified to include a dual commitment to real patterns
(qua relations) and objects (qua relata) to be applicable to natural kinds. The novel view,
with a dual commitment to perspective-independent entities, provides a solution to the
commitment problem for perspectival realism.
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According to Ladyman and Ross, natural kinds are nothing but scale-relative real
patterns of “high-indexical redundancy”.14 Indexical redundancy concerns the relative
distribution and measurability of real patterns in the universe. The more real patterns of
a certain kind there are, the more measurements we can take. The more measurements
we can take, the more objective real patterns are. What this means for natural kinds is
that by being of high-indexical redundancy, they are objective. That real patterns are
scale-relative means that what real patterns exist on a particular scale may not exist on a
different scale. For example, as Ladyman and Ross note “at the quantum scale there are no
cats; at scales appropriate for astrophysics there are no mountains” (p. 199). A variation
of scale, either temporal, spatial or energetic, may result in yet different real patterns
being observed. For example, when a transition from a larger to a smaller temporal scale
has been taken into account, it will not be surprising that certain patterns no longer exist
even if the spatial scale remains fixed. A case in point here comes from biology, where “in
histories of lineages at small enough temporal scales there is no natural selection, because
natural selection requires a substantial minimum number of reproductive events” (p. 203).
There is, however, an extra dimension to scale-relativity, call it numerosity.15 The basic
idea behind numerosity is that “more is different” (Anderson 1972). Sometimes “mere
numerosity makes a dramatic difference” (Ladyman and Wiesner 2018, p. 56). To say
that real patterns are numerosity relative is to say that some real patterns are only visible
with an increase in quantity. For example, “there are no cross-elasticities of demand in a
two-person economy” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 199).
Numerosity is particularly relevant to natural kinds for two reasons: first, because
to talk of kinds of objects, one must be able to compare individual objects; and second,
because likeness and difference can modify with the number of things, both synchronically
and diachronically. The first point is constitutive of the idea of kinds, whilst the second
concerns the evolution of kinds. Concerning the first point, Whewell (1840a) notes in ‘The
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences’ that “ ... before we can attend to several things as
14“ ‘Natural kind’ is a more elegant phrase than ‘real pattern of high indexical redundancy’ (...)”
Ladyman and Ross (2007), p. 297
15Ladyman and Wiesner 2018 introduce numerosity in complex science. The concept is borrowed with-
out assuming that kinds are complex systems.
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like or unlike, we must be able to apprehend each of these by itself as one thing” (p. 449).
To use Whewell’s example, the basic idea here is that to be able to talk about a tree, in
a forest of trees, we must apprehend the tree as one unit, with its own trunk, branches,
leaves and so on. Only once we have thus singled out each tree, we can attend to what is
alike and what is different amongst the trees. Having thus authenticated likenesses and
differences – i.e., relations – amongst various trees, we can formulate perspectives about
the most effective way of systematising said relations to enhance exactness, precision, and
empirical adequacy.
It is true that both of these acts – of singling out one entity and of finding relations
amongst many – are ‘operations of the mind’. Thus, it would seem that any result of these
operations would itself be an operation of the mind. To the extent to which one accepts
perspective-independence, one would, however, not draw such a parochial conclusion.
Instead, one would see that neither operation is purely an operation of the mind. Both
operations are grounded in repeated observations of empirical regularities. On the one
hand, repeated observations of trees in forests, and in isolation, warrant the belief that
“assertions concerning the object shall be possible” (p. 452). On the other hand, repeated
observations of trees would eventually lead one to notice that likeness in the shape of
leaves is far more common than likeness in the shape of the branches. Thus, on the basis
of such observations, the belief that “general assertions shall be possible” (p. 454) is also
warranted. Both of these assumptions are warranted to the same degree as induction
is warranted. Moreover, though these two operations are assumptions, they are at the
same time based on “[t]he unitermitting stream of experience [which] supplies us with an
incalculable amount of such observed connexions” (p. 455).
Singling out objects, comparing them, grading observed likeness and differences is
a laborious process that involves on the one hand assumptions and on the other hand
unremitting observations of empirical regularities. The more objects and relations are
observed the more laborious the process of organising likenesses and differences in a way
that is exact, precise, and empirically adequate. The more laborious the organisation, the
more contrived it seems. However, the process is always the same, involving assumptions
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and objects and relations equally. As more observations become available, the same process
is carried out at increasingly larger scales. Just as Whewell notes, the process repeats itself
as follows: “[a]s individuals by their resemblances form kinds, so kinds of things, though
different, may resemble each other so as to be again associated in a higher class; and there
may be several successive steps of such a classification” (p. 457). To the extent to which
this way of understanding classifications is correct, it is unclear how one can proceed
without objects. If, as Ladyman and Ross argue, “[t]here are no things” (p. 130) and
“[s]tructure is all there is” (id.), it is hard to imagine how one can talk about classifications
at all. For Ladyman and Ross to preserve their commitment to practice-relativity they
must also acknowledge that classification is part and parcel of the scientific practice. Since
classification, as shown, is based on a distinction between objects and relations, Ladyman
and Ross must make room for objects in their ontology.
The structural realist could accept perspective-independence whilst resisting the
reintroduction of objects and thus insist that there are ‘real patterns all the way down’.
The structural realist could argue that all the operations described earlier for objects, can
be similarly carried out, without loss, just with real patterns, in informational terms.Thanks
Joe Dewhurst, Bryan Roberts, and Neil Dewar for raising and discussing this point. Whilst
this option may be plausible for some contemporary practices, and would perhaps be par-
ticularly suitable to situations in which all the members of a kind are identical, situations
which originally motivated ontic structural realism,16 it still remains unclear how elimi-
nating objects from other practices would preserve both practice- and scale-relativity. If
the structural realist takes seriously classificatory practices, synchronically and diachron-
ically, as well as scale-relativity, there are practices in which both objects and relations
are equally important (for example, botany). Unless the structural realist shows for each
practice that only relations are fundamental, the motivation to do away with objects
quickly dissipates.
As regards perspectival realism, even without reintroducing objects, the real patterns
strategy can still provide a legitimate commitment to natural kinds via real patterns.
16Thanks to Richard Dawid for raising and discussing this point.
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But whilst this would make perspectival realism compatible with some practices, such as
physics, it would threaten perspectival realism’s commitment to epistemic pluralism and
thus risk once again one of its core commitments. Thus, a perspectival realist account of
natural kinds, must be committed to both objects (qua relata) and to real patterns (qua
relations) to qualify, by its own lights, as sufficiently perspectival.
The commitment problem for perspectival realism, let us recall, is the problem of suc-
cessfully integrating the perspectivalist commitment and the realist commitment within
an account of natural kinds. Does the natural kinds as real patterns account success-
fully integrate the two commitments? On the view proposed here a perspectival realist
natural kinds account would be committed to perspective-independent natural kinds as
real patterns. That is, it would be committed to perspective-independent objects and real
patterns, where real patterns are robust relations amongst entities exhibited by any two
given entities with sufficient regularity on any given scale. This is the ontological com-
mitment. The perspectival realist account proposed is also committed to practice- and
scale-relativity. Consider each commitment in turn.
It has been argued that there are two important stages of classification, and that
it is in the first stage – i.e., the authentication stage – that the ontological commitment
to natural kinds is secured. Authentication involves nothing over and above identifying,
measuring, and maintaining the salience of empirical phenomena. Since at this stage
what is at stake is validating empirical phenomena as genuine so as to further investigate
them in order to understand their nature, the authentication process does not rely on
perspectives regarding the nature of the phenomena. Thus, the process of authentication,
by involving few, if any, assumptions about the nature of the authenticated phenomena,
and by not prescribing any specific ontology for the relevant phenomena, can be taken to
secure an ontological commitment to perspective-independent real patterns. Thus, to the
extent to which the distinction between research traditions and perspectives is accepted,
the resulting commitment to perspective-independent natural kinds as real patterns can
be taken as a genuine ontological commitment, worthy of any realist account of natural
kinds. In the true spirit of perspectival realism, let us now briefly turn to three examples,
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taken from both contemporary scientific practice and history of science.
Modern astrophysical classifications proceeded by first identifying, measuring, and
cataloguing relations of likeness and difference as revealed in the spectra of stars. Fat,
thin, and fluted patterns on the spectroscopic photographs were authenticated without
prior knowledge of the information contained within them. Both Edward C. Pickering and
Henry Norris Russell, argued that the classifications should be based solely on the au-
thenticated spectra, in the absence of any perspectives regarding their nature (see Cannon
and Pickering 1901, Hoffleit 1991). Authenticated patterns revealed in the spectra of stars
constituted the basis of the first three instalments of the The Henry Draper Catalogue,
the third instalment being internationally adopted in 1910. With some modifications, due
in part to changes in the numerosity scale and in the spatiotemporal scale, the third in-
stalment of The Henry Draper Catalogue is still in use today. What this example shows
is that the practice of classifying stars is based on the authentication of their spectral
characteristics and on the systematisation of relations between stars as revealed by their
spectra. Authenticated real patterns are later investigated through the development of
perspectives on their origin, evolution, constitution etc.
The natural kinds as real patterns framework does not apply only to astrophysics,
but also to particle physics. For example, the classification of the positron involved its
authentication first, which was a complicated experimental and theoretical process (Cret¸u
forthcoming,a, Roque´ 1997, Darrigol 1988, Hanson 1961; 1962). The nature of the positron
was subsequently investigated by emerging perspectives (Roque´ 1997). Whilst multiple
perspectives on the nature of the positron begun to emerge towards the end of 1933, it was
the successful authentication of the positron which warranted a commitment to a new type
of perspective-independent kind, common to all relevant emerging perspectives (Cret¸u
forthcoming,a). This example shows that one can obtain an ontological commitment to
perspective-independent natural kinds as real patterns in the absence of perspectives
regarding their nature.
Let us now turn to the novel account’s applicability in biochemistry, focussing on
the classification of proteins. According to Havstad (2015; 2017), there are two stages to
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protein classification: the first stage concerns the individuation of proteins, whilst the sec-
ond stage involves the organisation of proteins. Havstad claims that “there simply isn’t a
plurality of ways to individuate proteins in scientific practice” (Havstad 2015, p. 76) since
“everyone agrees on the individuation of the basic entities being sorted” (id.). It is worth
noting that the individuation of proteins involves not only the identification of protein
tokens, but also the individuation of protein types. So it is both relata and relations that
are individuated prior to the development of various taxonomic perspectives. It is further
worth noting, that the individuation of relations and relata, as well as the development
of perspectives regarding their nature, are activities that take place “within the relevant
scientific field” (Havstad 2015, p. 76). To put it differently, both the individuation of token
and type proteins and the emergence of taxonomic perspectives involving authenticated
relations and relata fall within the purview of the same research tradition. What this ex-
ample shows is that an ontological commitment to perspective-independent real patterns
can be secured independently of perspectives regarding their nature.
Summing up, the natural kinds as real patterns account has been shown to re-
solve the commitment problem for perspectival realism by securing a commitment to
perspective-independent relations and relata and by being applicable to contemporary
and historical scientific practices within astrophysics, particles physics, and biochemistry.
5 Objections and Replies
Before concluding, there are two objections which need to be addressed. The first objection
concerns the naturalness of natural kinds as real patterns. What has been shown is that one
can be ontologically committed to perspective-independent natural kinds as real patterns.
But one can be equally ontologically committed to tables and chairs and to positrons and
other scientific kinds. What makes the latter different from the former? There are two
main distinguishing features. Unlike tables and chairs, positrons and other scientific kinds
are empirically authenticated phenomena and they have high-indexicality. In contrast to
positrons and other scientific kinds, tables and chairs have low-indexicality and they exist
only due to human’s collective intentions to bring them about for their use and comfort.
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Thus, we can say that kinds are natural insofar as they are authenticated within a research
tradition in the natural sciences.
Finally, the second objection concerns the relative priority between relations and
relata. One might be concerned that the lack of commitment regarding their relative
fundamentality17 is a weakness of the natural kinds as real patterns view. However, since
on the natural kinds as real patterns view, both relations and relata are authenticated
and not prescribed, the lack of a pronouncement on this issue is a strength, rather than
a weakness. Insofar as both relations and relata are authenticated, the natural kinds as
real patterns view can be said to be compatible with three distinct views concerning
the relative priority of relations and relata: a) a view on which relations are primary
and things are secondary, see Stachel’s (2006); b) a view on which things are primary
and relations are secondary, see Russell (1911); and c) a view on which neither things
nor relations are primary, see Esfeld and Lam 2008, Pooley 2006. Thus, regardless of a
pronouncement on the fundamentality of either relations or relata, what matters is that
there is an ontological commitment to both.
6 Conclusion
Perspectival realism has two core commitments: the perspectivalist commitment to the
situatedness of knowledge and the realist commitment to things in the world. Contem-
porary perspectival realists accounts lack a substantial realist commitment, a problem
that has been identified as ‘the commitment problem’. A new account – the natural kinds
as real patterns view – has been proposed as a solution to the commitment problem for
perspectival realism. Natural kinds as real patterns is the view according to which natural
kinds are real patterns, where real patterns are robust relations amongst entities exhib-
ited by any two given entities with sufficient regularity on any given scale. It has been
argued that what entities exist on a particular spatiotemporal or energetic scale and how
many entities there are on any spatiotemporal or energetic scale determine the natural
evolution of the relations that hold between entities at any relevant scale. It was fur-
17For fundamentality overviews see Stachel (2006) and McKenzie (2013).)
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ther shown that a research tradition affords the authentication of objects and relations,
whose nature is then explored through various perspectives sponsored by the research
tradition. The perspectives can be short lived, but when they go, the commitment to the
entities and relations authenticated within the research tradition remains. It is in this
sense that natural kinds as real patterns can be said to be perspective-independent, and
thus through them that the perspectivalist can secure a realist commitment. The natural
kinds as real patterns view has also been shown to apply to examples from astrophysics,
particle physics, and biochemistry.
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